Why do we feel this constant pressure to correctly call what is "what is".  I mean it's a great ability and all - but it's also interesting to experience what's it like to _not know_, perhaps not even care? :)

Well, of course, survival - we seem to have a hyperactive "survival mechanism".  As a species we are driven to survive in a way few other species can, and this leads us to build up a fairly accurate picture of how the world is, that's more comprehensive than most other species'.  But we're kind of on autopilot with this mechanism.  We've reached a stage where life is easier for most of us than it has ever been before, historically and in absolute terms, yet we continue to build these mental and physical bulwarks and safety nets.

Yet it's ok not to know, it's ok to be at a loss - about something.  Because that not-knowing is occuring in a broader context of knowing (the generational coral of truth, foursquare knowledge).

One of the most interesting things I've seen of Richard Feynman is in an interview where he says "hey, it's ok NOT TO KNOW STUFF", or something to that effect.  This was in the context of a discussion of religious belief. 

It strikes me that there's some kind of similarity between the Ontological Argument and Langan's idea of UBT (Unbound Telesis - raw possibility as it were) and the self-refining process arising from it (Telic Recursion).  Telic Recursion is a possibility that's inherent in UBT from yea time (as it were), as merely one of its infinite possibilities; so it must actualize "eventually" (again, sadly as it were - I wish I could put this in more rigorous language and not be forced to rely on poetry - but isn't Metaphysics the poetry of philosophy? :) ).  That's very much like the Ontological Argument saying that the "most perfect being" if conceivable must exist.

I'd put it this way: in the infinite ocean of raw possibility that's the only thing that logically must exist, there's the raw possibility that this infinite ocean of possibility may come to know itself.  The mechanism of self-knowledge that it births out of itself is Langan's SCSPL, which serially actualizes that possibility of self-knowing, and is logically the only thing that can do so.

This is actually what the Ontological Argument was getting at, I think, but its proponents who have seen a pattern here, haven't been able to put it yet in a way that makes sense.  It has been couched in the form of conceivability rather than possibility, leaving critics (like Kant) a point of attack at the point between something conceivable and something actual.

"Why is there something rather than nothing?"

If there's nothing, it follows with iron logical necessity that there's the possibility of something.  Nothing = possibility.

So possibility is what's logically necessary to exist, you can't get away from it.  If it can then be further shown logically that possibility must somehow issue in actuality also, then isn't the problem of existence solved?

(Can one say "nothing means 'not even possibility'?"  Word game.  "Nothing" must mean only: no actuality.)

I've been having a pleasant metaphysical rambling discussion with someone called Tim on the comments section devolving from the CTMU critique I cited in the last post.  I rather like this passage:-

In a plural, to degree N, society of "I am", there are N creative beings. Each one inviolate. And each one with his own proprietary "Universe". Then, each I am is real amongst this real society, but there simply is no external "objective" society. Know "I am" can fully know another "I am"; that's the hard part. The god of the materialists, "the universe", turns out to be a lie. (And why were they not more skeptical of IT?!) Each "I am's" own "universe" is a derivative representation of his WHOLE noumenal mind - within the plural society of spiritually communing / potent MINDS.

Tim, if you drop by, can we have more along these lines (expand it a bit, a bit more detail)?  I particularly like the pluralistic aspect.

Wonderful line from a Jeremy Jae one of the posters on this fascinating thread arising from a critical post on Chris Langan's CTMU at the Good Math Bad Math blog:-

Religious mystical experiences are literally anthropological self-interpretations of the core intelligence of the universe implicated within existence. Genius sees behind the veil of this religious garb into the otherness we call God. He experiences an affirmative moment of reflex in the cogito whereby the ineffable sense of the design itself gives some essential variable of it's wholeness. Many have said that genius is close to madness but they have not made the connection that high IQ could be linked to a transcendental form of intelligence i.e. the spiritual dimensions of IQ.

I find that an extremely interesting definition, as it's very close to Aleister Crowley's definition of "genius" (with the "practical" fruits of genius being spinoffs).  The cultivation of genius in this sense is the aim of AC's primary magickal organization, the A:.A:.

A shorter, more accessible TED talk version of the longer and more arduous, but more complete explanation of his theories Thomas Metzinger gave at a UC lecture I've already linked to on this blog before (link).

It's in two parts: Part 1, Part 2.

I'm guessing the accessibility mirrors his latest book The Ego Tunnel, which is for non-specialists, whereas the longer lecture was based on Being No One, which was a fuller, more scholarly presentation of his ideas.

An excellent example of modern, interdisciplinary philosophical research.  I cannot praise this highly enough.  Really hard problems that have puzzled philosophers - and human beings in general - for thousands of years are nearing solution/resolution here.  For my money, Metzinger is the Son in the Holy Trinity of modern philosophers of mind, the Father being Dennett, and the Holy Ghost being Manzotti.  I think between these guys, the problem of consciousness is pretty much cracked.  Manzotti may seem to be the odd one out (especially as his philosophy is couched in process philosophy terms, which is always a bit of a pain in the arse to some philosophers - Dennett has a similar problem with Umberto Maturana's process reformulation, which is actually quite similar to Manzotti's in some ways), but I'm convinced he supplies an important "missing link" that's not available either from Dennett's groundbreaking overview, or Metzinger's amazingly precise, more up-to-date formulation on the specific subject of the self.  Manzotti lays the groundwork for what I think is the correct answer to the "hard problem" that Dennett just seems to be blind to (although Dennett is quite right, in a way, that there is no "hard problem", but Manzotti answers the intelligence that notices, or thinks it notices, that "hard problem", better than Dennett does). 

Anyway, yeah, Metzinger.  Brilliant.

Was tootling around on FRDB talking about enlightenment, when I think I actually nailed something quite important (for me), on the distinction between "awakenings" or "glimpses", and full, final "liberation", or "moksha":-

As opposed to the sense of self disappearing in a peak experience, it's deeply, fully and finally understood that there never was a self in the first place.

It's not quite as dualistic here as I'm making it out to be (there's understanding in the peak experience, and liberation may involve a peak experience), but I think I've grasped a subtle distinction that's been eluding me for a long time.  The sense of self is a very different thing from the self.

Further, the latter, liberation, the nonexistence of the self, is to be understood not as a proposition (one can understand the meaning of the phrase "there never was a self in the first place" easily enough), but seen clearly (in a semi-Buddhist example, like a limpid pool on the beach, where you can see all the seaweed, crabs, etc., in bright sunlight).

Another point to note: the sense of self doesn't have to go away.  This is, I think, a crucial mistake many people make.  There's nothing wrong with having a sense that there is a self.  One doesn't need to live without that sense of self (indeed one probably couldn't, it is functional).  Rather, the idea is to understand that, despite there seeming to be a self, there actually isn't one.

Haha, plus ça change and all that. Was just browsing about the constitutional history of the USA, and came across this on Wikipedia:

When the war ended in 1783, certain special interests had incentives to create a new 'merchant state,' much like the British state people had rebelled against. In particular, holders of war scrip and land speculators wanted a central government to pay off scrip at face value and to legalize western land holdings with disputed claims. Also, manufacturers wanted a high tariff as a barrier to foreign goods, but competition among states made this impossible without a central government.

My bold.  Isn't that last sentence just delicious? 

Interesting list, especially in that nos. 6 to 14 in the list are all Democrat donors!

Interesting reading some Gyrus on pro-noble-savage idea.  Granted people are safer in civilisation in terms of percentage chance of being killed if plonked into it, than they would be if plonked into an archaic culture, Gyrus questions whether the absolute loss of (say) 140 people now is better than the absolute loss of 1 person in archaic times.  It's a good point, but the counter is that Gyrus is forgetting that many more people are also enabled to live due to the same civilizing measures that are reducing the percentage chance of being killed. Plus, what we're interested in is not the sheer statistic or number (and minimizing and maximising that).  The statistics are a guide to making a choice; the point is to consider the situation of the average random person being plonked into X situation.  One only uses oneself as an example to get the point across of how it would be better or worse for anybody.